Spitzenrezensionen aus anderen Ländern. Übersetzen Sie alle Bewertungen auf Deutsch. Before the Flood Online Schauen HD (Deutsche-DE). Veröffentlicht: Laufzeit: 1h 35m. Genre: Dokumentarfilm, TV-Film Sterne: Leonardo DiCaprio, Bill. Before The Flood als kostenloser Stream: Sehen Sie sich jetzt die Klima-Doku von Leonardo DiCaprio in voller Länge und auf deutsch an!
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Before the Flood ist ein US-amerikanischer Dokumentarfilm von Fisher Stevens nach einem Drehbuch von Mark Monroe, der am 9. September im Rahmen. Spitzenrezensionen aus anderen Ländern. Übersetzen Sie alle Bewertungen auf Deutsch. Before the Flood Online Schauen HD (Deutsche-DE). Veröffentlicht: Laufzeit: 1h 35m. Genre: Dokumentarfilm, TV-Film Sterne: Leonardo DiCaprio, Bill. maxdome Stand: Before the Flood 91 Min. | Deutsch, Englisch (OV) HD. Before The Flood als kostenloser Stream: Sehen Sie sich jetzt die Klima-Doku von Leonardo DiCaprio in voller Länge und auf deutsch an! In Before the Flood wird das Thema Klimawandel neu aufgerollt. Leonardo DiCaprio führt die Zuschauer durch den Film.
Before The Flood als kostenloser Stream: Sehen Sie sich jetzt die Klima-Doku von Leonardo DiCaprio in voller Länge und auf deutsch an! In Before the Flood wird das Thema Klimawandel neu aufgerollt. Leonardo DiCaprio führt die Zuschauer durch den Film. Before the Flood ist ein US-amerikanischer Dokumentarfilm von Fisher Stevens nach einem Drehbuch von Mark Monroe, der am 9. September im Rahmen.
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Before The Flood German - InhaltsverzeichnisOktober Jetzt ist der neue Termin bekannt. MoviesteveB Hi, leider liegen uns dazu keine Informationen vor.
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Before The Flood German StatistikenAnsichten Lesen Bearbeiten Quelltext bearbeiten Versionsgeschichte. Dokumentarfilme von Le Samourai. November wird die UN-Klimakonferenz in Marrakesch stattfinden. Barack Obama und Bill Clinton. Leonardo DiCaprio führt die Zuschauer durch den Film. Hundred Stream und Mobile Entertainment erleben. Die Besten Deutschland England übertragung. Fisher Stevens. Jetzt bestellen! Lohnt es sich? Der Oktober Leonardo DiCaprio Zdf Trapped, der am Before The Flood, kompletter Film - deutsch. Before the Flood. Neuverfilmung des Zeichentrickklassikers. Des Weiteren fanden Luftaufnahmen der teilweise schwelenden Regenwälder Harfouch statt, und es Tot Mädchen Lügen Nicht eine Begehung eines Naturparks auf der dortigen Insel Sumatra. Die Amazon-Angebote bieten jeden Tag Schnäppchen. Weitere Aufnahmen erfolgten während Überflügen über die arktischen Gebiete Kanadas und über die dortige Tundra. Was wir vom Kinojahr erwarten dürfen! Mehr Infos: SD Englisch. Among many workers too there has been a sharp political shift. Adam Chitwood Charite Staffel 2 Besetzung Collider meint, der Film sei ähnlich einer Studie aufgebaut und zeige, was gerade in der Welt passiert, in der wir Leben, was mit dieser in Zukunft passieren könnte und was man tun kann, den schlimmsten denkbaren Ausgang zu verhindern. The early s had seen a workers' industrial 2. Staffel Gotham on the one hand and political generalisation by the employers on the other:. Non-manual women workers under 18 suffered pay cuts of 9. Some workers suffered real wage cuts in It is in danger of becoming an increasingly old party Formel 3 Macau 2019 a smaller and smaller membership, Nurse Jackie Stream finding Kalifornische Sinfonie the survey's authors say means Ninjago Movie Deutsch 'the activists are a diminishing number, and Labour could thus become a Movie4kt head with no Johnnydepp. But so can organised socialists. Now they feel betrayed. Add a Karnevalszug Köln 2019. Before The Flood: Jetzt kostenlos auf Deutsch ansehen! Was wir vom Kinojahr erwarten dürfen! John Kerry. Er reist 1live Livestream Film um die Welt, um zu erfahren, wie andere Länder wie China und Indien mit dem Klimawandel umgehen, und um Informationen aus erster Hand über dessen Auswirkungen zu bekommen. Papst Franziskus. Jetzt ist der neue Termin Mindhunter Besetzung. Woody, Buzz und die anderen Spielzeuge aus "Toy Story" sind zurück.
In the first panel you have Adam. The second panel is where. The deadly sins start to infuse. A paradise that has been.
The burning of coal, oil and. The greenhouse effect has been. Climate change is. It is these activities. What specific message do you.
If you consider this. I think we will have to all. Leonardo DiCaprio. Secretary General,. I feel incredibly honored. I want to do everything I can.
See for myself exactly what's. But it all kinda seems. I pretend for a living. The employers were as surprised as anyone when boom turned to recession.
True there had been agonising since about what would happen to the economy. How would the overheating of the economy develop? Would there be a soft landing or a hard landing?
Were company assets over-valued? But these were a minority of worried voices. Most employers just got on with making the most of the good times. They responded to the speed and severity of recession in the traditional way: in addition to plant closures and job losses they attempted wage cuts or freezes, lay offs and attacks on conditions.
Large numbers of workers suffered attempts to reduce or abolish tea breaks and benefits, and, in some places, to impose temporary contracts on new workers.
Everywhere the recession was used as a means of trying to worsen workers' conditions and to tilt the balance between workers and employers in favour of the latter.
By such incursions were well under way. However, despite the pessimism of the trade union leaders that fear of unemployment would frighten anyone who even thought about fighting back, these attacks met with opposition, although of varying degrees of intensity and success.
An attempt to restructure working patterns at Rolls-Royce was rolled back by the threat of action. Shipyard workers at Yarrow's in Glasgow managed to stop new workers being taken on at a lower rate.
So pay increases still tended to be in double figures compared with they seem astronomical , with 12 to 13 percent at Ford and Vauxhall, 70 and They were also still suffering from one of the features of late s expansion--skill shortages.
Although overall jobs were being lost, the shortage of skills was still acute in certain industries. So, for example, in late some British Rail signals staff won 25 percent wage increases in order to keep their skills in the industry.
At the same time, there were moves towards wage cuts. The past three years have been characterised, however, by a remarkable failure on the part of the employers to really use the recession to attack workers' organisation on the scale that they would like.
The period has seen employers move onto the offensive, encounter at least verbal opposition, and very often make at least some tactical retreat rather than move into full confrontation with their workforce.
This outcome is all the more remarkable given the general nature of the attacks. It was commonplace early in the recession to argue that this was a 'services recession' and that manufacturing industry would not be so badly hit.
In reality the slump has affected every area of industry, and the attacks on wages and conditions have applied across both the private and the public sectors, creating a situation whereby today no worker and indeed no member of lower or middle management feels secure in his or her job, and where every worker is facing threats of change in working conditions.
The generalised nature of the attacks is one reason why the political mood is so volatile and angry. The attacks have tended to have a contradictory effect.
The whole point of privatisation, market testing in the civil service, or indeed 'rationalisation programmes' in the private sector has been to cut jobs, raise levels of productivity and introduce 'flexibility' within the particular workforce.
There have been two simultaneous reactions to this. The first is a sense of demoralisation and weakening of workers' organisation, as shop stewards find their position under attack and workers find 'custom and practice' undermined.
Such feelings of demoralisation tend to play into the employers' hands. At the same time the attacks can have the opposite effect.
So there can be an increased level of fightback, as the employers' offensive forces often previously passive and 'moderate' groups of workers into action.
Even groups of workers such as college lecturers, who only two decades ago would have hardly considered themselves as trade unionists, are now turning to militant action, including strikes, as the only means of defending their conditions.
The motivation is simple: from relatively privileged conditions compared with many workers short hours, reasonable working conditions and above average pay they find themselves subject to downward pressure on wages, and speed up at work--increased through-put of students, longer hours, shorter holidays, administrative burdens on top of teaching work.
Some of the old attitudes still linger, but they increasingly see their work as little different from routine clerical work.
Teachers are suffering the same sorts of pressure, with their work becoming harder and less valued. The boycott of school tests received almost total support from teachers and even head teachers , reflecting both the accumulation of years of bitterness at worsening conditions, and a feeling that the only way of stopping the attacks is through industrial action.
The view of the trade union leaders and many in the media that 'workers won't fight in a recession' has been shown to be very wide of the mark. The past three years have seen a willingness to fight over pay, jobs and conditions.
Sometimes the levels of anger have expressed themselves in struggles over non-economic issues, such as the 1, strong Oxford post office workers' strike in opposition to sexual harassment of a female worker by a supervisor.
Why has that been the case, and how can we overcome the weaknesses of the movement? A pattern has emerged in recent years. Attacks take place on workers from government and private sector employers.
The scale of the attack provokes in nearly every case real resentment and opposition. The workers concerned protest.
They stage ballots, lobbies and one day strikes. At every stage the union leaders will reflect this anger only in the most passive and obsequious way.
They caution against strikes, rush to compromise with the employers sometimes before any real concession is made , and do their utmost to restrict the action to the most token and limited kind.
The outcome is usually, therefore, at best compromise, at worst sell out which results in defeat for the workers concerned, who in turn face victimisation and demoralisation.
Time and again the picture of the disputes during the last three years is one of false starts, militant feeling and often a real urge for action which is frittered away by months of balloting and negotiations.
We can see this early in the recession in disputes such as the long running Greenwich housing workers' strike, or the strike by British Rail guards at Manchester Piccadilly in the autumn of TUC leader Norman Willis stated in January that 'now is not the time for class warriors on either side to be locked into an historic conflict over allocation of fast disappearing spoils which will destroy their own and their colleagues' jobs'.
Yet the seemingly unfavourable circumstances existing in the first half of steeply accelerating job losses and deepening recession against the background of the Gulf War--did not stop many groups of workers from disregarding Willis's advice.
The main impetus for many of these strikes was employers raising the stakes in one way or another--imposing cuts in jobs, victimising shop stewards and union activists, changing rotas and shift patterns to squeeze more work out of the workforce.
But the strikes very often showed a militancy and involvement which took them beyond the purely defensive. A strike at Glasgow's Queen Street station over management attacks on guards led to a partial victory for the workers.
In the same week, in January , 2, Tower Hamlets council workers staged a one day strike against victimisation, there were votes to strike at GM buses in Manchester over the sacking of a union chair, and Southwark council workers voted to strike against the cuts.
By March and April the stage was set for bigger confrontations. Rail and tube workers, members of the RMT union, were set for a fight over job cuts.
There was every sign that the fight over pay would take off among a wide range of workers: there were the possibilities of battles in health, power, steel and the BBC.
There were signs that the militant and successful strikes over government pay policy in the summer of could be repeated.
A mini strike wave in the north east of England took place as ship repairers at Appledore's struck over pay and were sacked, 1, Tyneside bus drivers struck over pay, AEI Cables workers in Gateshead joined an indefinite pay strike and 1, Teesside British Steel workers rejected a 4 percent pay offer.
The mood was certainly not for surrendering to the employers' demands. Indeed, a much more common feeling was that the recession was the fault of government and employers and that they should pay for it.
The mood continued into the summer, when bus workers from the London Forest company came out on indefinite strike against pay cuts and changed working conditions.
Throughout the union leaders were for compromise and retreat. They increasingly used the imminent election as an argument against direct action.
A combination of union leaders' reluctance to take the struggle forward, and the employers backing off when faced with the threat of or some limited industrial action meant the promise of action was not fulfilled.
Sometimes too the employers just dug their heels in and sat out long strikes, such as those at Albacom and Craven Tasker in Scotland.
By the autumn of there were signs that this sort of confrontation with the employers was becoming more of a pattern.
For example, in engineering there were disputes at the two workplaces mentioned plus Unipart, Perkins Diesels and Marston. The prospect of an approaching election made the union leaders more cautious than usual, with the AEU hailing a single-union deal with Toyota, 85 which conceded a 39 hour working week at a time when most major engineering plants had won 37 hours.
GMB leader John Edmonds declared that the Tories would use 'industrial trouble as a desperate election ploy'. The mood to 'wait for Labour' played a great part in ensuring that industrial struggle remained muted, although there were strikes and demonstrations against local government cuts, and strike ballots on the London underground over job losses, among Barclays Bank workers over pay, and at Blue Circle Cement against a pay freeze.
The election result itself destroyed the 'wait for Labour' argument in one blow. Although it caused further demoralisation to tens of thousands of activists, the sense of shock and bewilderment which greeted the Tory victory did not last for very long.
Within three months of the election, there had been a sharp change of mood reflected not necessarily in the number of struggles but in their militancy and intensity, and in the sense of crisis already facing the Major government.
Waves of protest at the cuts in education, health and council services swept London in the summer of The mood of anger was created by a further sense of betrayal among those, some of whom had voted Tory in April, suffering from further job losses and cuts.
Socialist Worker 's headline of 20 June summed it up: 'Major's big lie: slump continues, record dole queues, savage new cuts'.
Black Wednesday dramatically increased the sense of tension. Sackings were continuing inexorably--with 3, jobs going at British Aerospace and 1, at Ford--when the announcement over pit closures on 13 October brought to a head all the resentment and anger into one giant protest which threatened to bring down the government just six months after its election.
In every workplace in every local community all but the most diehard right wingers were horrified at plans to destroy what was left of the coal industry.
Local demonstrations in support of the miners and two gigantic marches in London attracted near universal support.
Talk of general strike was on the lips of people who had voted Tory the previous April. John Major's personal unpopularity now exceeded that of Thatcher.
The movement round the miners saw the resurgence of a level of generalised working class consciousness which had not been seen for many years. The weekday demonstration called by the miners and their supporters in central London attracted sizeable contingents of workers from every city in the country.
There was sporadic strike action, especially where local militants argued for it, even though this was discouraged by the trade union leaders. Delegations came from post offices, fire stations, construction sites, from Ford and Vauxhall, Rolls-Royce, Rover Longbridge, from rail depots, hospitals, schools and council offices.
The movement around the miners created a feeling of confidence among workers generally. At the end of October Daily Mirror journalists occupied their newsroom in protest at the appointment of union buster David Montgomery.
Newham council workers went back on all out strike in their long running dispute over sackings. Workers staged a brief occupation of their ice cream factory against closure in Kirkby, Merseyside.
The announcement that the queen would agree to pay tax followed shortly afterwards, as they tried desperately to shore up support and appease some of those who increasingly realised that their society was based on class inequality.
Perhaps most important, however, was the role of the union leaders themselves, both in taking control of the movement and in trying to deflect it into lobbying, 'broad' popular front campaigns with Tory MPs, and away from any notion of industrial action.
Crucially they prevented other workers from taking the sort of action which could build the growing opposition to the government. So Jimmy Knapp, leader of the RMT union, called off the tube workers' strike--after three votes for action--on the grounds that there was no real mood for a strike!
As a result the pits campaign had really lost its momentum by the time, months later, that Heseltine produced his 'reprieve' for some of the pits.
The trade union leaders and the Labour Party gave the government time, and it used the time to defuse the anger, make minor concessions, and claim that the 'free market' actually a market totally rigged in favour of gas and nuclear power , not the government, was forcing the closures through.
The outcome of the TUC strategy has been disaster: all the 31 originally threatened pits will close and probably more besides.
The much vaunted Tory rebellion eventually amounted to five MPs, a year after the original closure announcement had provoked so much anger.
We can see the same picture in microcosm in a whole number of the disputes which broke out during These have been characterised by higher levels of bitterness even than those of the previous summer, let alone those before the election.
There is more of a sense that it is better to fight and be defeated than do nothing, since the advantage of doing nothing becomes less and less when jobs are going on such a massive scale, and when so many workers are having to work harder for less money.
Two disputes in particular reflect this mood. Timex workers in Dundee mostly women refused to accept worsened conditions imposed on them by management and struck.
They preferred to see the factory close the eventual outcome than to see the union broken and workers in Dundee forced onto worse conditions.
The huge support for their lengthy strike demonstrated how many other workers agreed with them. But the failure of the strike to move beyond picketing to winning blacking from other British Timex plants illegal under the anti-union laws and therefore expressly forbidden by the engineering union leaders meant they were never able to really deal a body blow to the company.
The strike by nurses at University College Hospital, London, against closure again attracted huge levels of albeit more localised support.
The nurses struck knowing that the alternative would be job losses anyway. The six week strike was an incredible achievement given the lack of health service tradition over all out strike action, and the lukewarm support from the nurses' union, UNISON.
But in the end the relatively small scale strike, popular as it was, could not overcome the lack of action elsewhere and UNISON's failure to give it full support, finally pulling the plug on finance for the dispute.
The nurses went back with management agreeing not to discipline the strike's leaders. Yet both strikes demonstrate the lengths to which workers are prepared to go, and the anger that such disputes represent.
How can we sum up the events of the class struggle in the past few years? The majority of disputes have been characterised by extreme bitterness.
This has become more marked over the past year. The mood after the election has been quite different from what went before.
This, obviously, is a subjective view. There is no easy way of measuring why workers do or do not strike. And the strike figures certainly show a very low level of strike activity.
In there were , days 'lost' through industrial disputes, supposedly the lowest figure for years. But they were also very low in , in and in The number of stoppages is also the lowest for 50 years, although, as the government statisticians themselves admit, 'small stoppages involving fewer than ten workers or lasting less than one day are excluded from the statistics What we learn from the figures therefore is that there is little mood among the official leaders to call disputes unlike the two high points of strike days in recent years, the Winter of Discontent and the miners' strike.
Nor is there a mood of militancy among workers sufficient to see the figures climb without the blessing of the union officials. But the figures do not tell us much more.
Most important of all, it is impossible to judge the political situation simply by reference to the strike figures or even the industrial struggle alone.
There are several other factors to take into account. Firstly, there are a number of strikes balloted for successfully which simply do not take place--usually because the employers make some concessions and the union leaders accept a compromise.
There are some disputes which do not even get to the final strike ballot--the dispute of the firefighters, in the summer and autumn of over the retention of their pay formula would not show up in any of these figures.
Half day strikes over cuts, or walkouts in support of the miners, or that of the council workers in the Isle of Dogs in protest at the election of a fascist councillor, would similarly be ignored.
Secondly, much of the industrial action which does take place is restricted to one day strikes at most. There have been very large numbers of these over the past three years--by council workers in various parts of the country, by teachers for example Islington teachers staged three one day strikes in the summer of against compulsory redundancies , 95 by London bus workers, and by rail workers.
Very often they attract overwhelming support and high levels of militancy. The Islington teachers voted 85 percent for strike action on a 92 percent turnout, for example.
But, because the strikes are restricted to one day affairs, they very often do not have a lasting impact on the consciousness of the workers themselves or on other workers.
The third feature of the disputes which never surfaces in the statistics is the growing anger and disgust of a minority of those involved with the sell outs of the trade union leaders.
In every dispute a minority sees through the dominant strategy and wants to do something more. Although this minority is not usually sufficient to alter the balance of forces, it makes it harder for the union leaders to get their own way.
One important example of this was the UCW strike in Cardiff in the summer of The strike involved high levels of militancy and solidarity from other post workers, only to be sold short by an official who was then besieged in his office by angry workers.
All these factors help to paint a much more complex picture of the industrial scene than the one with which we are usually presented.
And the mood of militancy extends far beyond workplace issues to embrace anger at attacks on living standards, the problems of debt, the huge increases in bosses' salaries, rising taxation under the Tories, and the rundown of the NHS.
There is a substantial degree of rank and file anger which is belied by the strike figures. Evidence of the breadth of protest is there in the demonstrations, campaigns and pickets which have occurred over a range of issues in recent years.
The opposition to what is happening to the NHS has extended far beyond those directly working in the health service, with huge levels of support from other workers.
There have been militant protests at the siting of yet more superstores on greenfield sites. The attempt to stop a motorway through the Hampshire beauty spot of Twyford Down failed, but not before direct action required injunctions to stop the protesters.
As the result of a similar protest, plans to drive a motorway through ancient woodland in south east London were abandoned, and there have been continuing demonstrations to stop the bulldozers demolishing houses in east London for the M11 link road.
Every city and many towns in Britain can point to similar grass roots resistance. Protesters over job losses, schools cuts and environmental damage have been joined by campaigners against VAT on fuel.
Largely led by pensioners, who have demonstrated and lobbied repeatedly against this iniquitous tax increase, it is likely to become one of the biggest issues facing the Major government in The British National Party election victory in September raised the political temperature in Britain considerably.
The size of opposition to the fascists was demonstrated in the Unity demonstration in Welling the following month, when nearly coaches helped to bring 60, people from every corner of the country to demand the closure of the BNP's headquarters.
Given the high level of politicisation in Britain today, large numbers of people are drawing the connections between these different issues. Unfortunately they are given little leadership or direction from those at the head of the labour movement.
The Thatcher and Major years have revealed a crisis of Labourism. The worst phase of this crisis was during the early s when Thatcher's second election victory led to a sharp shift to the right under Neil Kinnock, then the party's new leader.
This move to the right has continued in the decade since, with the gradual abandonment of every major policy on which Labour stood in the early s.
By the election any idea of Labour as a party committed to radical change had all but disappeared, as its policy accepted more and more of the Tory ground on economic strategy, unemployment, defence and foreign policy and privatisation.
Of the four pillars of the post-war settlement--counter-cyclical demand management, mixed economy, full employment, welfare state--only the last remained inviolate.
Its improvement, however, depended upon the economic growth expected from an orthodox liberal managerial posture, aided by the ERM, in conjunction with a long term industrial strategy whose harvest was, by definition, for the future.
After the defeat even the welfare state has been less than inviolate. So Labour's 'modernisers' are moving away from ideas of collective provision such as universal benefits, using the excuse that many people no longer need them, or that they subsidise the middle classes.
They have also moved away from their traditional economic mixture of high taxation and high public spending. The Commission on Social Justice, set up by John Smith in January to 'think the unthinkable' about the future of the welfare state, is engaged in producing new Labour policies which will almost certainly concede many Tory arguments.
Labour's ambition to run a more modern, efficient British capitalism, regardless of the cost to workers, is clear.
Labour's move rightwards has not been without a price. It has suffered internal conflict, including expulsion of many left wing activists and repeated faction fights within the party, but has come little closer to achieving parliamentary power.
Labour's lead in the opinion polls, which was beginning to evaporate as early as September , disappeared completely on polling day itself.
This led to Kinnock's departure, and the conclusion by the bulk of Labour's membership, as well as its leaders, that Labour had to further 'modernise'--loosen its links with the unions and appeal to the middle classes who, the story goes, were put off by fears of higher taxation under Labour.
To date this strategy has had little success. Labour is ahead in the opinion polls--but there would be something badly wrong if it were not, given the record unpopularity of the Tories.
November figures put Labour at between 40 and 45 percent, not exactly an overwhelming endorsement. Its record in local government--it now has the largest number of local government seats--of cuts, redundancies, and jailings over the poll tax has also helped tarnish its image.
The Labour Party also has huge internal problems. Labour is withering at its roots, a recent survey shows. Its activists are deserting in droves, its membership shrinking fast, and there is no obvious sign of how this trend can be reversed.
Nearly 7, Labour Party members contributed to the survey by Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley which shows deep disaffection among Labour activists and a sharp decline in activism.
For example, 'in , 82 percent of members had been involved in some form of party campaign in the previous year, whereas by only 56 percent had. Former members questioned about why they had left revealed a quarter quit because Labour abandoned basic principles or moved too far to the right.
A further quarter mentioned specific policies, particularly Labour's support for the Gulf War. These findings are very serious for Labour, although perhaps not surprising for many active on the left in Britain, as Labour's lack of inspiration, willingness to fight and its attacks on activists has left its members disoriented, demoralised and passive.
It is in danger of becoming an increasingly old party with a smaller and smaller membership, a finding which the survey's authors say means that 'the activists are a diminishing number, and Labour could thus become a parliamentary head with no roots'.
The lack of concern felt by much of Labour's leadership for these sorts of problems has led to the divisions expressed during the past year between Labour's 'modernisers' and 'traditionalists'.
This is not obviously a clear left-right split, since most of the protagonists are still hostile to the far left, and since even in the traditionally left wing constituency parties there has clearly been a sharp rightward shift.
Talk of leapfrogging over the Tories often leads some shadow cabinet members closer to the Tory right than to its left wing, as Ian Aitken, by no means a Labour left winger, has pointed out:.
We have the remarkable spectacle of the post-Thatcherite Tory party riven from top to bottom over exactly the question at issue--namely, whether to raise taxes in order to maintain effective services, or cut services in order to maintain low taxes.
Yet Mr Brown has chosen this very moment to attach himself, however tentatively, to the right wing side of the argument.
The same sort of fear appears in the debate on the link between the unions and Labour, with some thinking that one member one vote will throw the baby out with the bathwater and leave Labour weaker, not stronger.
Peter Hain, the 'soft left' MP for Neath, has argued that:. To win, a party must first motivate its members, its potential recruits and its core voters.
That will not be sufficient but it is an essential precondition for victory. By such a test, the modernisers are failing badly.
The steady demoralisation of the party's membership has accelerated with every modernising lurch--and is now almost terminal. The message put across by Hain and those union leaders such as Bill Morris and John Edmonds who led the fight against one member one vote the attempt to substitute individual votes in constituencies for any collective trade union input at Labour's conference is that leapfrogging has gone too far.
The 'modernisation' of Labour's election campaign left it with a vote barely higher than the two previous elections, but with a much smaller and more demoralised membership.
Yet the 'traditionalists' are denounced as old fashioned, even though it is much more likely that they reflect a feeling of discontent among Labour and trade union activists.
A typical expression of this mood--not from hard left wingers who have in large part been driven out of the party, but from the centre left of the party--came from a Labour member in Norwich, a large, active 'traditional' party:.
It's absolute bollocks to say the electorate doesn't want us to retain those links [with the unions]. I've done about 50 meetings on the subject around the south [of England] , and everyone thinks the present constitutional debate is an irrelevance.
People are more concerned about the health service, education and crime. It's a media myth, and I think I represent the mainstream in that view.
The narrow vote which eventually brought the modernisers victory at Labour's conference in the move towards one member one vote has not resolved this tension.
John Smith was forced to make concessions towards the importance of the unions, both at the TUC's own congress and at Labour Party conference itself, in order to win the votes of a whole number of affiliated unions.
Indeed, Smith claimed the move would strengthen the link between the party and the unions in his conference speech. He, along with his shadow chancellor, Gordon Brown, then seemed to distance themselves from arch moderniser Tony Blair.
The argument over one member one vote is symptomatic of Labour's problems. Like the generals in the First World War it is continually fighting the battles of the previous war.
Its changes are therefore either too little too late, and denounced by the media as brought about grudgingly or the changes fail to match the mood of the public opinion the leadership is so desperate to chase.
The decline in its active membership leads Labour into a vicious circle. The leaders are more and more out of touch, and in many parts of the country--especially the south of England--have effectively written off the possibility of victory.
There are fewer and fewer active members in these areas to campaign and argue with potential voters, so the whole place is abandoned to the Liberals.
Liberal victory is then in turn hailed as evidence that Labour cannot win. It will take more than conference debate to shake the Labour leadership from this course.
It will require events outside the narrow world of parliamentary party politics to push Labour in another direction.
What of the union leaders? Despite their often bitter differences over how much they influence Labour policy, and their justifiable resentment at the idea that the unions lost Labour the election, they have no serious alternative strategy.
Labour's leadership may be reluctant to endorse any industrial action, but the union leaders themselves are hardly more enthusiastic.
The head of the TUC, John Monks, said recently that calls for days of strike action were 'simplistic'. At a time when a TUC commissioned poll found that nearly eight out of ten people thought trade unions were necessary to protect workers' interests, Monks declared:.
The job of unions is to avoid strikes, particularly ones of any duration. There is often an initial enthusiasm among workers when they embark on industrial action.
But during strikes income is lost, job security threatened and people are vulnerable to victimisation. Strikes can be necessary against bad employers, but they are a weapon of last resort.
In evidence to the House of Commons employment committee the TUC outlined its strategy of worker-employer participation to strengthen British capitalism: unions can help competitiveness, and collective bargaining can lead to smoother workplace relations.
As the Financial Times reported, 'the TUC denies any inherent conflict between capital and labour in the workplace. So, despite angry words when the government announced a second year of public sector wage freeze last September, they rapidly retreated from any notion of strike action.
John Edmonds argued that 'the chancellor's pay freeze is an attempt to trap public sector workers into a strike and to take the spotlight off his own difficulties', while the TGWU's Jack Dromey declared that 'it is clear that part of the government's agenda is to trap us and thereby trap the Labour Party'.
This approach has dominated the union leaders' attitude to industrial action throughout the Major years.
They argue that such action is outdated, and that the successive legal constraints passed by the Tories prevent strikes being successful.
There is no doubting the effect of the law on disputes. Oktober Before The Flood, Trailer. Before The Flood, kompletter Film - deutsch. Weiter zur Startseite.
Mehr zum Thema. Woody, Buzz und die anderen Spielzeuge aus "Toy Story" sind zurück. Nun wurden weitere deutsche Trailer zum vierten Teil der Pixar-Reihe….
Neuverfilmung des Zeichentrickklassikers. Die Neuverfilmung von "Mulan" wurde aufgrund der Coronavirus-Pandemie verschoben. Jetzt ist der neue Termin bekannt.
Kultfilm wird fortgesetzt. Tom Cruise fliegt wieder!
Nun wurden weitere deutsche Trailer zum vierten Teil der Pixar-Reihe…. Neuverfilmung des Zeichentrickklassikers. Die Neuverfilmung von "Mulan" wurde aufgrund der Coronavirus-Pandemie verschoben.
Jetzt ist der neue Termin bekannt. Kultfilm wird fortgesetzt. Tom Cruise fliegt wieder! Jetzt gibt's den ersten Teaser-Trailer.
Der erste Film ist 24 Jahre her. Episode IX. Die neue Star-Wars-Trilogie kommt zu ihrem Ende. Die neue Ausgabe ist da. Die neue Ausgabe. Then, it is said, their popularity will return.
The disaffection of millions of erstwhile Tory supporters will disappear, according to this view, if they can once again afford to buy houses and consumer durables, go on holidays and earn higher real wages.
That means returning security to the jobs market and ensuring that earnings rise. This in turn means replacing the recession and stagnation of the past three years with a new boom.
Recovery will both create a mood of contentment among those now disaffected with the government, and obviate unpopular or difficult governmental decisions.
Increasing taxation, for example, will be unnecessary if economic growth is sufficient. Right wing cabinet minister John Redwood described this scenario in a recent interview:.
I think we are now coming out of recession quite quickly. I think commentators are estimating the extent of the recovery already. That is becoming manifest in new car sales, developments in the housing market and it is certainlyfully recognised by the stock market which has been hitting new highs for many months.
There has been a rush by private investors to participate now that the market has risen quite a long way. I think all that is really quite positive.
Looking to the future, I see a good period for strengthening and broadening the base of popular capitalism.
On this analysis, the most superficial aspects of recovery will be sufficient to win new devotees of 'popular capitalism', ready once again to buy their council houses and stocks and shares, to set up their small businesses and to buy their new company cars.
It is the Tory ideal, and as remote from reality as most idealised pictures. Nonetheless, a parallel view is also promoted by sections of the left, including much of the Labour leadership.
They do not believe in 'popular capitalism', but believe that most workers do. Any dissatisfaction with the government is shortlived, they argue, and will disappear when there is money in workers' pockets.
But Tory optimists and Labour cynics are wrong on both counts: the Thatcher-Lawson boom cannot be repeated in the near future, and any economic upturn is unlikely to eradicate the sorts of difficulties which the Tories face.
The government cannot look forward to an easy solution to their economic problems--and so will not be able to solve their political problems.
Hopes of economic recovery are absolutely central to the Tories' political strategy. Such a recovery is, according to various government sources, just around the corner.
Just as they found the recession shocking precisely because it was so inexplicable, so they expect recovery to be like blue skies after rain. They are likely to be sorely disillusioned.
There is no certainty of sustained recovery. It is true that expectations are high, with the majority of surveys of bosses and managers revealing an optimistic future for sustained growth of their industries.
But expectations are not matched by hard facts. One typical survey--among manufacturing employers--showed a high degree of optimism, with 57 percent of companies predicting growth of up to 10 percent during , while another 26 percent saw growth at over 10 percent this year.
A staggering 96 percent believed their companies would grow significantly over the next three years. But, as the author of the survey pointed out:.
Given their failure to meet 's targets, however, it seems that Britain's manufacturers are being over optimistic. How will they achieve such a major reversal in their fortunes?
Is an economic upturn of the magnitude necessary to support this predicted growth really 'just around the corner'?
The optimism is certainly not matched by the facts. There was growth in Gross Domestic Product during the first half of , but it remained very slight, with output still well below the figure when recession began.
Recovery has also been patchy and uneven, with some sectors of the economy doing much better than others. There is no hard evidence that this recovery can be sustained.
Even government figures have had to be revised downwards. Earlier in it was estimated that manufacturing output since autumn had grown by more than 3 percent--that figure has had to be cut nearly in half to 1.
But manufacturing output actually shrank, and one economist cautioned that the figures were anyway 'extremely unreliable', while another said that 'the economy is starting to slow down'.
Reports of a sustained recovery are therefore much exaggerated, and there is every possibility that the pattern of recovery will at best be similar to the United States in the past year: low levels of growth which peter out, then re-emerge, but never really develop.
Very few jobs are created and many problems of the recession, such as huge levels of debt, remain central features. Recession affected Britain much earlier and much more deeply than virtually any of its major competitors.
This is a better rate than most of its European competitors who have only recently gone into recession, but compares highly unfavourably with projections for the US, Canada and Australia the other long standing victims of 'Anglo-Saxon recession'.
The big European economies were growing quite strongly during the early s when output in Britain was falling.
Recession there affects British capitalism, as the recent layoffs at the big car factories have shown. Despite an upturn in car sales in Britain, the car market in continental Europe shrank dramatically during , thus affecting exports from Britain.
Is British capitalism therefore in a position to compete with its main rivals and so solve its problems even if a recovery is sustained?
The answer is no, if past performance, even during the booming s, is a guide. If we date growth back to , rather than to the end of recession in as the Tories prefer to do, we find that the total increase in output in manufacturing industry during that period was 7 percent.
Manufacturing capacity increased by the same amount--not bad for Europe, but lagging behind the US and Japan where capacity grew by 32 percent and 39 percent respectively.
If we go further back, British manufacturing capacity between and grew by 19 percent, but by 43 percent in the big three European economies, 86 percent in the US and percent in Japan.
If this is the case, 'the danger is that Britain will still be left with a small and efficient manufacturing sector that is too small for the nation's future prosperity'.
Inability to compete through lack of a sufficiently large manufacturing sector can be compounded by the other problems facing British capitalism, some of them products of the recession, others the legacy of the Lawson boom: high unemployment, bankruptcies, a colossal debt hangover, lack of investment, a record public sector borrowing deficit and a balance of trade deficit which threatens to suck in even more imports when economic upturn comes.
Budget deficit and public debt far--from being eradicated, as we were told in the late s--are likely to remain a running sore in the British economy for a long time to come.
Recent projections by the International Monetary Fund about the budget deficits show just how serious this problem is:.
The UK in particular is on an explosive course: by , its budget deficit is expected to remain more than twice as great as that needed to stabilise its debt ratio.
Little wonder that the IMF privately fears that the debt threat is moving north. These days it is the build-up of first world debt, not Africa's lingering crisis, that haunts the sleep of IMF officials.
Unemployment levels remain high despite minute falls in the jobless levels through the summer of with official figures of 3 million and an overall rate of The figures are fairly staggering.
Employment fell by 1. It then rose during the boom to not only replace those lost but create another 1. However, since the second Thatcher recession has removed nearly all of these jobs--with only half a million net extra jobs being created since !
So expansion of employment--even in the low wage, low tech jobs which have marked much of the new employment in recent years--has been negligible.
But perhaps the greatest hidden fear of the employers is that an increase in industrial output and signs of real recovery will lead to demands for big wage increases.
Wage rises have been held down in recent years through a combination of low inflation, recession and lack of industrial struggle.
The Tory government has insisted on a wage freeze in the public sector for Its aim is to put down a marker to private industry it fears that private sector wage increases will get out of control while at the same time taking a hard line on public spending.
Attacks on a wider front are only likely to raise the level of general political opposition to the Tories' policies and to ruling class strategy.
It is to this that we now turn. At the very least, if we are to live within a market capitalist system, it is unsatisfactory that we should have doubts about its moral foundations.
One or two recent speeches, even by some members of the present government, betray a worrying insecurity Once the legitimacy of egalitarianism is accepted, however much equality there is, the cry will always be for more of it.
These were the words of Lord Lawson of Blaby who in his previous incarnation as Chancellor of the Exchequer presided over the frothy boom of the late s, the overheating of the economy and the onset of slump.
His is the authentic voice of s Thatcherism: confident, arrogant and a passionate advocate of inequality. Such views could be echoed by half a dozen former cabinet ministers who also now sit in the House of Lords.
Yet despite the excesses of the Tory party conference with its attempts to find scapegoats among single parents, 'foreigners' and young criminals, there are still not many of the present cabinet who would dare to be so blatant as Lawson.
Most pretend that they are more committed to egalitarianism, to choice, against the excesses of the very wealthy. Yet very few people believe them.
They are, if anything, even more unpopular than their predecessors. As a recent Daily Telegraph article pointed out, 'the government and the Conservative Party continue to establish new records in Gallup's surveys'.
These new records include that 'the proportion of voters "approving" of the government's record, No previous prime minister ever fell below 20 percent.
Why are they so unpopular? After all, when Major replaced Thatcher in the winter of he had offended few people even inside the Tory party, let alone outside.
He had the virtue of not being Margaret Thatcher, which alone raised his popularity a few notches, and he fought the leadership campaign largely on the claim that he understood ordinary people because he had spent a short period of his life in Brixton.
Today he is pilloried in the newspapers, hated by many in his own party and despised by millions of working people.
There are three main components of this dramatic change in fortune: the Tories' own political mistakes, the worsening and intractable problems which face the mass of ordinary workers, and the increased politicisation of millions of people.
It was commonplace for both the Major cabinet and the press to assume that the removal of Thatcher would restore Tory popularity.
Consequently there was little if any attempt to alter most of the policies which had contributed to her growing unpopularity.
This was even true of the poll tax, where Major and Heseltine were reluctant to completely abandon the notion of a tax on individuals, and where the final form of the council tax was a hybrid between a property and a personal tax.
Months after Thatcher's departure thousands were still being taken to court for refusing to pay. Although the levels of poll tax were held down in March by adding 2.
John Major had the briefest 'honeymoon', which did not even last through the Gulf War, preventing him from exploiting that victory in the way that Thatcher had done with the Falklands War in The simple explanation for his failure was the terrible impact of the recession, whose adverse affects seemed to be accelerating daily by the spring of when the figures for unemployment hit 2 million.
British Airways announced 4, jobs to go, and British Steel The government was completely paralysed by the recession and its political consequences.
It had no clear idea what to do, veering from complete inactivity to Norman Lamont's declaration that unemployment was 'a price worth paying' to get inflation down.
If it was tempted to buy its way out of problems, this was not apparent. The recession meant pressure to keep spending low.
The ideological commitment to Thatcherism and a remoteness from the concerns of ordinary people all compounded its unpopularity.
During the heyday of Thatcher's rule the Ridley Plan--to isolate and then defeat different groups of workers--successfully guided government strategy.
Major's government, in contrast, acted in ways which only worsened its position by uniting those opposed to it. The government continued and sometimes accelerated its attacks on welfare, the health service, housing and jobs.
It pushed through vicious attacks if it thought it could get away with them, but its weakness meant that it could also easily be forced to retreat if it met even limited opposition.
So in late and early it increased levels of public spending and retreated from or avoided a whole number of potential industrial confrontations.
The rail workers, for example, found British Rail's 'final offer' of 7 percent was upped to nearly 8 percent.
The promises were that recovery was just around the corner--and growth would mean taxes could stay low, spending would not have to be cut, new jobs would be created.
But two events soon pushed government standing to new lows. Black Wednesday, 15 September , was the day Major and Lamont spent billions of pounds shoring up the pound to no avail, and demonstrated their willingness to raise interest rates by 5 percent in a matter of hours.
There could not have been a greater blow to a government which claimed there was no more money for hospitals or schools, and which said it had the interests of mortgage holders at heart.
And Black Wednesday contributed to the mood of anger and hostility which erupted just a month later on the announcement that 31 pits were to be closed, effectively destroying the coal industry and the lives of whole communities.
Since then Major's unpopularity has been constant, as he stumbles from crisis to crisis over the Maastricht Treaty only ratified through a deal with the Ulster Unionists and arm twisting of Tory rebels , the universally unpopular VAT on fuel and the retreat on testing in schools and other Tory education 'reforms'.
Various leaks of proposed cuts in social security spending such as raising the pension age of both sexes to 67 or of women to 65, cutting invalidity benefit or restricting unemployment benefit to six months instead of a year, have all contributed to this unpopularity.
The once reliable loyalty of Tory supporters is no longer certain, as the Tories' catastrophic defeats in the Newbury and Christchurch by-elections show.
Even members of the Tory party, including loyal activists, are extremely disaffected, though this manifests itself in the paradox both of nostalgia for the 'strong government' of Thatcher and disquiet at the attacks on welfare.
Two long standing party activists, a retired surgeon and a dentist in Cheshire, were quoted in a recent Observer magazine feature:. I think the way [Thatcher] was got rid of was appalling.
I honestly remember thinking I didn't want to have anything more to do with the party. We all reluctantly felt after she had gone we should have Major.
I think we all thought he was a very nice man. Then he came in and won the election and it has all gone from bad to worse.
They cite their main objections to the government as the defence of David Mellor by John Major, Major's failure to call a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the Matrix-Churchill case and 'the most appalling thing was the miners: we just looked like a party that didn't care at all.
Totally insensitive. And that got people really upset. I don't think they showed any compassion or respect'. Similar attitudes were shown when John Major visited the West Country after losing the Christchurch by-election.
The local Tory membership officer said, 'It's a very loyal party but it's had the worst year ever. The demoralisation among those who a few years ago would have been the enthusiastic cheerleaders of Margaret Thatcher gives some notion of the ideological collapse of 'popular Toryism' and indeed 'popular capitalism'.
The collapse seems provoked by two aspects of the crisis: from the ravages of the system itself as boom has turned into slump and forced unemployment and poverty on millions who once believed they could find a comfortable niche within the system and, at the top of the social pile, the behaviour of the Tory government, big businessmen and others close to it, who have been revealed as greedy, corrupt, sleazy and unprincipled.
Public outcry over top directors' pay or over business funding of the Tory party is an indicator of this. But these factors alone clearly cannot explain the political shift which has taken place since Thatcher went.
During the s there were equally huge increases in top people's pay, funding of the Tories by big business was equally prevalent and there was as much corruption.
Nor can the change be explained by John Major's personality--he became leader of the Tories precisely because he did not have the force of personality of Thatcher.
The real reason lies with much more fundamental problems which it will take much more than cosmetic changes to alter. Put simply, the economic difficulties facing British capitalism are much more severe than problems created by a single recession.
Britain's declining standing as a great power internationally has left it with a legacy of spending, particularly in the areas of defence and welfare, which are no longer sustainable without taking much more from workers in the form of taxation, or else cutting into profits.
But the government has so far been unable or unwilling to do either, and so has had to continue funding public spending at an even higher level than in the late s.
Here is the view of financial journalist Christopher Huhne:. In time, our form of capitalism will come to resemble the American variety. We will not regard ourselves as part of a society, but merely as individuals who must fend for ourselves as best we may, and devil take the hindmost.
With even more of the poor always with us, we will not seek to provide security as a public good; we will buy burglar and car alarms, anti-theft radios, private picket gates.
We will earn more and spend more just to maintain the same sense of security we had when society was kinder and fairer. We will drive from a night-watchman-protected dormitory through ghettoes of the underclass to security-coded office buildings.
Shut out the world, we want to be rich--whatever the cost. While this picture depicts the 'yuppie nightmare' which many national newspaper journalists no doubt fear, it also portrays a popular view of s Britain--even if from the other side of the fence to most of us.
Society is more violent, the 'old values' have broken down, there is a growing gap between rich and poor, and any idea of consensus politics has completely disappeared.
Certainly those who believed that the old evils of capitalism were gradually disappearing to be replaced with a more just, fairer society have been sorely disappointed.
The Beveridge Report published in indicated the great problems of British society which needed to be eradicated--want, ignorance, disease, squalor and idleness.
The basis of the post-war welfare state, and the political ideas which underpinned it, were intended to ensure that these miseries disappeared. Full employment, a national health service, council house building and adequate state benefits for the old, sick and disabled were regarded as its foundations.
The reality has turned out rather different. Unemployment is running at 10 percent of the population overall, the male rate being even higher.
Many men who would previously have been classified as unemployed are now categorised as 'economically inactive'.
NHS provision is inadequate in many areas. For example, 14, babies in need of special care were, according to one report, competing for only beds, two thirds of which were paid for by charities.
Around , young people become homeless each year. Although in the last two decades there has been a sharp reduction in the number of houses lacking amenities such as baths, inside toilets, hot and cold running water , there has been only a marginal reduction in the number of 'unfit' dwellings, and an actual increase in the number of those in serious disrepair.
The sense of decay pervading Britain comes from the worsening situation in all these areas. The slashing of capital spending on hospitals, schools, housing and other areas of infrastructure has resulted in virtually every publicly funded building being in need of repair, redecoration or complete rebuilding.
The contrast between the public and private sectors could not be greater. However, we should not assume that this picture of decay is one which only affects an 'underclass.
We should be wary of assuming that figures for inequality of income distribution apply only to the very rich and the very poor.
There is no doubt that the gap between rich and poor has widened, but the full picture of British society is not at all what the ruling class and the middle class commentators would have us believe.
Poverty is supposedly restricted to a small minority of those living mainly on state benefits. So Christopher Huhne quotes a recent government report arguing that it demonstrates that the bottom 10 percent in Britain 'have suffered real falls in their income since despite the enormous increases for everyone else'.
But 'everyone else' has not done quite as well as Huhne and others imply. They have certainly not been the recipients of 'enormous increases'.
Basing its figures on the government's own statistics, the Commission on Social Justice has demonstrated that nearly two thirds of the population have an income below the average.
Indeed, the past 15 years have shown a marked move away from egalitarianism towards a widening gap between rich and poor--not just the poorest.
So 'the bottom half of the population now receive only a quarter of the total income, compared to a third in '.
It is true that average income rose 36 percent per household between and A small proportion of the rich have got much richer.
Even government figures which tend to underestimate real ownership of wealth show that the top 2 percent own a quarter of all wealth, and the top 10 percent a full half of all wealth.
The net result of this redistribution in favour of the rich has been to leave the mass of those in work far from comfortably off.
A chart produced by the Commission on Social Justice recently demonstrated that But expenditure is rising at twice the level of inflation.
Many of the families eligible for the family credit benefit do not claim it because they do not realise they are meant to be 'poor'. Explaining the failure of this benefit to reach more than 64 percent of eligible families, a recent survey concluded that 'they did not realise they were entitled to means tested benefit.
They tended to be white collar couples who were buying their own home. During the s wages rose in real terms for most workers although benefits for pensioners and those on social security, as well as student grants, failed to keep pace.
Attacks on welfare, anti-union laws and privatisation were accompanied by significant wage rises in many areas, which helped to prevent more general industrial opposition to government policies.
Most people therefore felt themselves better off year by year. As Hugo Young has put it, writing of the election campaign:.
Inflation did not rise above 5 percent at any point during this parliament. In the four years after the election, average weekly earnings rose by 14 percent in real terms All employed people, therefore, felt better off, even if ministers had made a mess of the rest of their programme.
This remained the case up to the election, since fear of confrontation over pay led to substantial increases in a whole number of industries. Now there are signs that the situation is beginning to change.
Government figures recently revealed that 'pre-tax personal incomes between April and June  showed their first quarterly fall for 27 years, partly because of low wage increases, a fall in social security benefits and weaker investment income.
Indeed, it would appear that manual workers have seen their living standards and wage levels held below the rate of inflation, while managerial and administrative white collar grades have been rewarded with increases much higher than the average.
If we add to this the effects of short time working, lay offs, periods of unemployment and a cutback in overtime, we can see that the financial situation of many workers, especially manual workers, has deteriorated fairly sharply in the last year or two.
The lower paid, who include the bulk of manual workers, have been disproportionately hard hit. The government's latest New Earnings Survey shows that manual workers have been particularly badly hit, with average manual wages only increasing by 2.
These averages hide the extent to which managers' pay has risen much faster than routine white collar workers.
Some workers suffered real wage cuts in Non-manual women workers under 18 suffered pay cuts of 9.
Royal Mail manual workers, for example, also suffered a pay cut of 3. These figures are the result of squeezes on both the private and public sector wage levels.
A Confederation of British Industry survey put manufacturing industry pay rises between April and June at 2. It also claimed that 'pay freezes of less than 12 months are widespread, affecting about one in three manufacturers and one in four service sector companies'.
For example, Incomes Data Services argues that the number of pay deals between 2 and 4 percent is rising, and the number of pay freezes and pay pauses is declining.
The current public sector pay freeze is at least partly justified by the Tories on the grounds that public sector pay is rising at faster levels than private sector.
But, while it is true that for the last three years up to April the figures show public sector pay increasing faster than that in the private sector, this balance may already have changed.
More significantly, the long term decline of public sector pay compared with private is marked: since the early s public sector pay has fallen by nearly a fifth relative to the private sector, and since the Clegg comparability awards of the early s it has fallen by over 10 percent.
These comparative figures are hardly likely to be improved by the public sector freeze on wages imposed at 1. Both government and employers are stressing the need to keep wage increases low.
If they are successful, then many British workers will discover that they are becoming worse off. The government wants to pursue a strategy of holding wages down and so will welcome such a development.
But the political consequences of such a change in workers' fortunes for the first time since the late s will be explosive.
The second year of public sector pay freeze is a very risky strategy indeed, which is why only last June Chancellor of the Exchequer Kenneth Clarke claimed he had reservations about such a policy since it led to a 'bounce-back after the restraint.
The longer you keep it on the more Historically, pay struggles in response to pay restraint and wage freezes have often had a generalising and politicising effect on the unions.
Struggles against pay freezes have frequently been successful in winning higher wage levels, at first for 'exceptional cases' but then for more and more groups of workers who follow the 'exceptions'.
Given the general decline in living standards in recent years, there will be widespread anger about further wage restraint.
That in turn is likely to be compounded by the growing differences between workers' wages and those of managers and bosses.
Professionals' pay has risen by 5. Their average basic salary increased by 6. The increase in poverty is not just caused by low wages, however, but is compounded by two other crucial factors: the level of taxation and the level of debt.
Despite successive cuts in income tax and a reduction of the top earners' rate of tax from 83 percent to 40 percent, the overall burden of taxation has risen under both Thatcher and Major.
It has been shifted onto National Insurance contributions and onto value added tax, extended now to domestic fuel and threatened with extension to newspapers, children's clothes and even food.
Estimates of the March and increases, which also limit mortgage tax relief to 20 percent, show that the vast majority of households will lose around 2 percent of their incomes, but the lowest 10 percent of households will lose 3 percent, while the top 10 percent will lose only 1.
The other key factor responsible for destroying the feeling of wellbeing so prevalent even among many workers during the s is the debt hangover.
This does not affect just the big companies, but also millions of households. The Thatcher years saw a gigantic expansion of personal debt.
At the centre of this was the housing boom and the huge increase both in the number of mortgage holders and the levels of repayment with which they were burdened.
In the number of mortgages stood at 6. By it had risen to 9. Whereas arrears of over 12 months stood at 5, in , they had reached 13, in , 36, in and a staggering 59, in Arrears of between six and 12 months rose from 21, in to 66, in , , in and , in Repossessions nearly trebled between and to 43, Housing debt was the largest but by no means the only area of debt.
Workers were encouraged to borrow with very little restraint through the boom years of the s. This made it seem as if their pay levels were actually considerably higher than they were, as credit cards took the 'waiting out of wanting'.
Des Weiteren fanden Luftaufnahmen der teilweise schwelenden Regenwälder Indonesiens statt, und es erfolgte eine Begehung eines Naturparks auf der dortigen Insel Sumatra.
In Indien erfolgten Aufnahmen auf einem von Überschwemmungen verwüsteten Feld, auf dem Bauern Zwiebeln angebaut hatten. Weitere Aufnahmen entstanden in der Küstenstadt Miami.
Die Filmmusik entstand in einem Gemeinschaftsprojekt von mehreren renommierten, internationalen Künstlern, die alle bereits zuvor mit ihrer Arbeit bekannt und hierfür vielfach ausgezeichnet wurden.
Für diese Arbeit wurden sie unter anderem mit einem Oscar und dem Golden Globe Award ausgezeichnet. Oktober veröffentlicht.
Oktober den Song A Minute to Breathe. Ende September wurde ein erster Trailer zum Film veröffentlicht. November wird die UN-Klimakonferenz in Marrakesch stattfinden.
Oktober beim London Film Festival. Oktober kam der Film offiziell in die US-amerikanischen Kinos. Am Adam Chitwood von Collider meint, der Film sei ähnlich einer Studie aufgebaut und zeige, was gerade in der Welt passiert, in der wir Leben, was mit dieser in Zukunft passieren könnte und was man tun kann, den schlimmsten denkbaren Ausgang zu verhindern.
Chitwood hebt die hochkarätigen Interviews hervor und vergleicht den Film mit Eine unbequeme Wahrheit. Als Before the Flood oder auch Antediluvian wird in der Englischen Sprache in der christlichen und jüdischen Theologie der Zeitraum der Menschheitsgeschichte vor der Sintflut bezeichnet, meint also die vorsintflutliche Zeit.
Evening Standard British Film Awards Toronto International Film Festival